Causal Effects in Matching Mechanisms with Strategically Reported Preferences
Paper joint with Margaux Luflade and Ismael Mourifié
Abstract: A growing number of central authorities use assignment mechanisms to allocate students to schools in a way that reflects student preferences and school priorities. However, most real-world mechanisms give students an incentive to be strategic and misreport their preferences. In this paper, we provide an identification approach for causal effects of school assignment on future outcomes that accounts for strategic misreporting. Misreporting may invalidate existing point-identification approaches, and we derive sharp bounds for causal effects that are robust to strategic behavior. Our approach applies to any mechanism as long as there exist placement scores and cutoffs that characterize that mechanism's allocation rule. We use data from a deferred acceptance mechanism that assigns students to more than 1,000 university-major combinations in Chile. Students behave strategically because the mechanism in Chile constrains the number of majors that students submit in their preferences to eight options. Our methodology takes that into account and partially identifies the effect of changes in school assignment on various graduation outcomes.