Research Interests

Game Theory; General Equilibrium Theory; Microeconomic Theory

Selected Publications

• "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," (with D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole), in  Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, ed. Alvin E. Roth, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 73-98, 1985.
• "Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies," (with T. Kehoe), Econometrica, 53: 433-453, 1985.
• "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," (with D. Fudenberg), Econometrica, 57: 759-778, 1989.
• "Efficiency and the Value of Money," Review of Economic Studies, 56: 77-88, 1989.
• "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," (with D. Fudenberg), Review of Economic Studies, 59: 561-580, 1992.

Awards

• Departmental Scholar in Economics, UCLA, September 1975 - June 1977
• Foundation for Research in Education and Economics Fellowship, September 1976 - June 1977
• Phi Beta Kappa, Summa Cum Laude in Mathematics, UCLA, June 1977
• Daus Prize in Mathematics, UCLA, June 1977
• Graduate Fellowship, MIT, September 1977 - June 1981
• Foundation for Research in Education and Economics Grant, Summer 1982
• UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations Grant 1982 - 84
• Office of Instructional Development Grant, UCLA, Summer 1984
• Academic Senate Research Grants, UCLA, 1981 - 1999, 2000

Background

After completing his Ph.D. degree at MIT in 1981, he joined UCLA’s faculty as an assistant professor, and was there later tenured and then promoted to the full. He has served on the editorial board of many top journals and is currently co-editor of Econometrica. He is currently the President of the Society of Economic Dynamics. He has served on the NSF economics panel and on the American Economic Association’s Committee on Honors and Awards. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society. His research is on game theory, general equilibrium theory, and macroeconomic theory.